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Abstract
In this paper, we apply the idea of fictitious play to design deep neural networks (DNNs), and develop
deep learning theory and algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric N -player non-
zero-sum stochastic differential games, for which we refer as deep fictitious play, a multi-stage learning
process. Specifically at each stage, we propose the strategy of letting individual player optimize her own
payoff subject to the other players’ previous actions, equivalent to solve N decoupled stochastic control
optimization problems, which are approximated by DNNs. Therefore, the fictitious play strategy leads
to a structure consisting of N DNNs, which only communicate at the end of each stage. The resulted
deep learning algorithm based on fictitious play is scalable, parallel and model-free, i.e., using GPU
parallelization, it can be applied to any N -player stochastic differential game with different symmetries
and heterogeneities (e.g., existence of major players). We illustrate the performance of the deep learning
algorithm by comparing to the closed-form solution of the linear quadratic game. Moreover, we prove
the convergence of fictitious play under appropriate assumptions, and verify that the convergent limit
forms an open-loop Nash equilibrium. We also discuss the extensions to other strategies designed upon
fictitious play and closed-loop Nash equilibrium in the end.
Keywords: Stochastic differential game, fictitious play, deep learning, Nash equilibrium
1 Introduction
In stochastic differential games, a Nash equilibrium refers to strategies by which no player has an incentive
to deviate. Finding a Nash equilibrium is one of the core problems in noncooperative game theory, however,
due to the notorious intractability of N -player game, the computation of the Nash equilibrium has been
shown extremely time-consuming and memory demanding, especially for large N [16]. On the other hand,
a rich literature on game theory has been developed to study consequences of strategies on interactions
between a large group of rational “agents”, e.g., system risk caused by inter-bank borrowing and lending,
price impacts imposed by agents’ optimal liquidation, and market price from monopolistic competition.
This makes it crucial to develop efficient theory and fast algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium
of N -player stochastic differential games.
Deep neural networks with many layers have been recently shown to do a great job in artificial intelli-
gence (e.g., [2, 39] ). The idea behind is to use compositions of simple functions to approximate complicated
ones, and there are approximation theorems showing that a wide class of functions on compact subsets can
be approximated by a single hidden layer neural network (e.g., [53]). This brings a possibility of solving a
high-dimensional system using deep neural networks, and in fact, these techniques have been successfully
applied to solve stochastic control problems [20, 29, 1].
In this paper, we propose to build deep neural networks by using strategies of fictitious play, and develop
parallelizable deep learning algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric N -player non-
zero-sum stochastic differential games. We consider a stochastic different game with N players, and each
player i ∈ I := {1, 2, . . . , N} has a state process Xit ∈ Rd and takes an action αit in the control set A ⊂ Rk.
The dynamics of the controlled state process Xi· on [0, T ] are given by
dXit = b
i(t,Xt,αt) dt+ σ
i(t,Xt,αt) dW
i
t + σ
0(t,Xt,αt) dW
0
t , X
i
0 = x
i, i ∈ I, (1.1)
where W := [W 0,W 1, . . . ,WN ] are N + 1 m-dimensional independent Brownian motions, (bi, σi) are
deterministic functions: [0, T ]×Rd×N ×AN ↪→ Rd×Rd×m. The N dynamics are coupled since all private
states Xt = [X
1
t , . . . , X
N
t ] and all the controls
1 αt = [α
1
t , . . . , α
N
t ] affect the drifts b
i and diffusions σi.
∗Department of Statistics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027-4690, rh2937@columbia.edu.
1Although in the literature of math finance, one usually models bi and σi to only depend on player i’s own action, but it
is common in literature of economics that player i’s private state is also influenced by others’ actions, e.g., αit is a priced set
by companies and Xit is the production quantity. To be general, we include this feature in our model, which yields (1.1).
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Each player’s control αit lives in the space A = H2T (A) of progressively measurable A-valued processes
satisfying the integrability condition:
E[
∫ T
0
∣∣αit∣∣2 dt] <∞. (1.2)
Using the strategy α ∈ AN , the cost associated to player i is of the form:
J i(α) := E
[∫ T
0
f i(t,Xt,αt) dt+ g
i(XT )
]
,
where the running cost f i : [0, T ]× Rd×N × AN ↪→ R and terminal cost gi : Rd×N ↪→ R are deterministic
measurable functions.
In solving stochastic differential games, the notion of optimality of common interest is the Nash equi-
librium. A set of strategies α∗ = (α1,∗, . . . , αN,∗) ∈ AN is called a Nash equilibrium if
∀i ∈ I and βi ∈ A, J i(α∗) ≤ J i(βi,α−i,∗), (1.3)
where α−i,∗ represents strategies of players other than the i-th one
α−i,∗ := [α1,∗, . . . , αi−1,∗, αi+1,∗, . . . , αN,∗] ∈ AN−1.
In fact, depending on the space where one searches for actions (the information structure available to the
players), the types of equilibria include open-loop (W[0,t]), closed-loop (X[0,t]), and closed-loop in feedback
form (Xt). We start with the setup (1.3) which corresponds to the open-loop case, and shall comment on
the generalization of deep learning theory for closed-loop cases in Section 5.3.
An alternative method of solving N -player stochastic differential games is via mean-field games, intro-
duced by Lasry and Lions in [36, 37, 38] and by Huang, Malhame´ and Caines in [28, 27] . The idea is to
approximate the Nash equilibrium by the solution of mean field equilibrium (the formal limit of N →∞)
under mild conditions [9], which leads to an approximation error of order N−1/(d+4) assuming that the
players are indistinguishable, i.e., all coefficients (bi, σi, f i, gi) are free of i. We refer to the books [10, 11]
and the references therein for further background on mean-field games. However, beyond the case of a
continuum of infinitesimal agents with or without major players, the mean-field equilibrium may not be a
good approximation in general. In addition, the mean-field game often exhibits multiple equilibria, some of
which do not correspond to the limit of N -player game as N →∞, e.g., in the optimal stopping games [49].
Moreover, when the number of players is of middle size (e.g., N ∼ 50), the approximation error made by
the mean-field equilibrium is large while directly solvers based on forward-backward stochastic differential
equations (FBSDEs) or on partial differential equations (PDEs) are still computationally unaffordable.
Therefore, it is demanding to develop new theory and algorithms for solving the N -player game.
The idea proposed in this paper is natural and motivated by the fictitious play, a learning process in
game theory firstly introduced by Brown in the static case [6, 7] and recently adapted to the mean field
case by Cardaliaguet [8, 5]. In the fictitious play, after some arbitrary initial moves at the first stage,
the players myopically choose their best responses against the empirical strategy distribution of others’
action at every subsequent stage. It is hoped that such a learning process will converge and lead to a Nash
equilibrium. In fact, Robinson [56] showed this holds for zero-sum games, and Miyazawa [43] extended it
to 2 × 2 games. However, Shapley’s famous 3 × 3 counter-example [57] indicates that this is not always
true. Since then, many attempts are made to identify classes of games where the global convergence holds
[42, 46, 47, 24, 14, 3, 23], and where the process breaks down [31, 44, 19, 34], to name a few.
Based on fictitious play, we propose a deep learning theory and algorithm for computing the open-loop
Nash equilibria. Unlike closed-loop strategies of feedback form, which can be reformulated as the solution
to N -coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations by dynamic programming principle (DPP), open-
loop strategies are usually identified through FBSDEs. The existence of explicit solutions to both equations
highly depends on the symmetry of the problem, in particular, for most cases where explicit solutions are
available, the players are statistically identical. Therefore, an efficient and accurate numerical scheme
is crucial for solving such FBSDEs. Traditional ways run into the technical difficulty of the curse of
dimensionality, thus are not feasible when the dimensionality goes beyond 5. Observing impressive results
solved by deep learning on various challenging problems [2, 35, 39], we shall use deep neural networks to
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overcome the curse of dimensionality for moderately large N and asymmetric games. We first boil down the
game into N stochastic control subproblems, which are conditionally independent given past play at each
stage. Since we first focus on open-loop equilbria (as opposed to closed-loop ones) in each subproblem, the
strategies are considered as general progressively measurable processes (as opposed to functions of (t,Xt)).
Therefore, without the feedback effects, one can design a deep neural network to solve stochastic control
subproblems individually. The control at each time step is approximated by a feed-forward subnetwork,
whose inputs are initial states X0 and noises W[0,t] in lieu of the definition of open-loop equlibria. For
player i’s control problem, X−i is generated using strategies from past, i.e., considered as fixed while player
i optimizes herself.
Main contribution. The contribution of deep fictitious play is three-fold. Firstly, our algorithm is
scalable: in each round of play, the N subproblems can be solved in parallel, which can be accelerated by
the feature of multi-GPU. Secondly, we propose a deep neural network for solving general stochastic control
problem where strategies are general processes instead of feed-back form. In lack of DPP, algorithms from
reinforcement learning are no longer available. We approximate the optimal control directly in contrast
to approximating value functions [54]. Thirdly, the algorithm can be applied to asymmetric games, as for
each player, there is a corresponding neural network.
Related literature. Most literature in deep learning and reinforcement learning algorithms in stochastic
control problems uses DPP with which, the problem can be solved backwardly, i.e., to find the optimal
control at the terminal time, and then decide the previous decision. Among them, let me mention the recent
works [29, 1], which approximate the optimal policy by neural networks in the spirit of deep reinforcement
learning, and the approximated optimal policy is obtained in a backward manner. While in our algorithm,
we stack these subnetworks together to form a deep network and train them simultaneously. In fact, our
structure is inspired by Han and E [20]. The difference is that they feed the network with Xt seeking for
feedback-form controls, while we feed the initial statesX0 and noisesW[0,t] for each player’s network, seeking
for open-loop Nash equilibrium. In terms of using fictitious play to solve multi-agent problems, [?, ?, ?]
design reinforcement learning algorithms assuming the system (1.1) is unknown; while our algorithm needs
the knowledges of bi, σi, f i and gi.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we systematically introduce the deep fictitious play theory,
and implementation of deep learning algorithms using Keras with GPU acceleration. In Section 3, we
apply deep fictitious play to linear quadratic games, and prove the convergence of fictitious play under
proper assumptions on parameters, with the limit forming an open-loop Nash equilibrium. Performance of
deep learning algorithms are presented in Section 4, where we simulate stochastic differential games with a
large number of players (e.g., N = 24). We make conclusive remarks, and discuss the extensions to other
strategies of fictitious play and closed-loop cases in Section 5.
2 Deep fictitious play
In this section, we describe the theory and algorithms of deep fictitious play, which by name, is known
to build on fictitious play and deep learning. We first summarize all the notations that shall be used as
below. Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P), we consider
• W = [W 0,W 1, . . . ,WN ], a (N + 1)-vector of m-dimensional independent Brownian motions;
• F = {Ft, 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, the augmented filtration generated by W ;
• H2T (Rd), the space of all progressively measurable Rd-valued stochastic processes α : [0, T ]×Ω ↪→ Rd
such that ‖α‖2 = E[
∫ T
0
|αt|2 dt] <∞.
• A = H2T (A), the space of admissible strategies, i.e., elements in A satisfy (1.2). AN = A×A× . . .×A,
a product of N copies of A;
• α = [α1, α2, . . . , αN ], a collection of all players’ strategy profiles. With a negative superscript,
α−i = [α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αN ] means the strategy profiles excluding player i’s. If a non-negative
superscript n appears (e.g., αn), this N-tuple stands for the strategies from stage n. When both
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exist, α−i,n = [α1,n, . . . , αi−1,n, αi+1,n, . . . , αN,n] is a (N − 1)-tuple representing strategies excluding
player i at stage n. We use the same notations for other stochastic processes (e.g., X−i,Xn);
We assume that the players start with an initial smooth belief α0 ∈ AN . At the beginning of stage
n+ 1, αn is observable by all players. Player i then chooses best response to her beliefs about opponents
described by their play at the previous stage α−i,n. Then, player i faces an optimization problem:
inf
βi∈A
J i(βi;α−i,n), J i(βi;α−i,n) = E
[∫ T
0
f i(t,Xαt , (β
i,α−i,n)) dt+ gi(XαT )
]
, (2.1)
where Xαt = [X
1,α
t , X
2,α
t , . . . , X
N,α
t ] are state processes controlled by (β
i,α−i,n):
dX`,αt = b
`(t,Xαt , (β
i,α−i,n)) dt+ σ`(t,Xαt , (β
i,α−i,n)) dW `t + σ
0(t,Xαt , (β
i,α−i,n)) dW 0t , X
`,α
0 = x
`,
for all ` ∈ I. Denote by αi,n+1 the minimizer in (2.1):
αi,n+1 := arg min
βi∈A
J i(βi;α−i,n), ∀i ∈ I, n ∈ N, (2.2)
we assume αi,n+1 exists through out the paper. More precisely, αi,n+1 is the player i’s optimal strategy at
the stage n + 1 when her opponents dynamics (1.1) evolve according to αj,n, j 6= i. All players find their
best responses simultaneously, which together form αn+1.
Remark 2.1. Note that the above learning process is slightly different than the usual simultaneous fictitious
play, where the belief is described by the time average of past play: 1n
∑n
k=1α
−i,k. We shall discuss this
with more details in Section 5.1.
As discussed in the introduction, in general one can not expect that the player’s actions always converge.
However, if the sequence {αn}∞n=1 ever admits a limit, denoted by α∞, we expect it to form an open-loop
Nash equilibrium under mild assumptions. Intuitively, in the limiting situation, when all other players are
using strategies αj,∞t , j 6= i, by some stability argument, player i’s optimal strategy to the control problem
(2.1) should be αi,∞t , meaning that she will not deviate from α
i,∞
t , which makes (α
i,∞
t )
N
i=1 an open loop
equilibrium by definition. Therefore, finding an open-loop Nash equilibrium consists of iterating this play
until it converges.
We here give an argument under general problem setup using Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle
(SMP). For simplicity, we present the case of uncontrolled volatility without common noise: σi(t,x,α) ≡
σi(t,x), ∀i ∈ I, σ0 ≡ 0, and refer to [11, Chapter 1] for generalization. The Hamiltonian Hi,n+1 :
[0, T ]× Ω× RdN × RdN ×A ↪→ R for player i at stage n+ 1 is defined by:
Hi,n+1(t, ω,x,y, α) = b(t,x, (α,α−i,n)) · y + f i(t,x, (α,α−i,n)),
where the dependence on ω is introduced by α−i,n. We assume all coefficients (bi, σi, f i) are continuously
differentiable with respect to (x,α) ∈ RdN ×AN ; gi is convex and continuously differentiable with respect
to x ∈ RdN ; A ∈ Rk is convex; the function Hi,n+1 is convex P-almost surely in (x,α). By the sufficient
part of SMP, we look for a control αˆi,n+1 ∈ A of the form:
αˆi,n+1(t, ω,x,y) ∈ arg min
α∈A
Hi,n+1(t, ω,x,y, α),
and solve the resulting forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs):
dX`,n+1t = b
`(t,Xn+1t , (αˆ
i,n+1(t,Xn+1t ,Y
n+1
t ),α
−i,n)) dt+ σ`(t,Xn+1t ) dW
`
t ,
dY `,n+1t = −∂x`Hi,n+1(t,Xn+1t ,Y n+1t , αˆi,n+1(t,Xn+1t ,Y n+1t )) dt+
N∑
j=1
Z`,j,n+1t dW
j
t ,
X`,n+10 = x
`
0, Y
`,n+1
T = ∂x`g
i(Xn+1T ), ` ∈ I.
(2.3)
4
If there exists a solution (Xn+1,Y n+1,Zn+1) ∈ H2T (RdN × RdN × RdN×mN ), then an optimal control to
problem (2.1) is given by plugging the solution into the function αˆi,n+1:
αi,n+1t = αˆ
i,n+1(t,Xn+1t ,Y
n+1
t ). (2.4)
Now suppose (2.3) is solvable, the sequence given in (2.4) converges to α∞ as n → ∞. Denote by
(X∞,Y ∞,Z∞) the solution of (2.3) with αn being replaced by α∞. If the system possesses stability, then
(X∞,Y ∞,Z∞) is also the limit of (Xn+1,Y n+1,Zn+1). In this case, given other players using α−i,∞,
the optimal control of player i is
αi,∞(t,X∞t ,Y
∞
t ) = lim
n→∞ αˆ
i,n(t,Xnt ,Y
n
t ) = lim
n→∞α
i,n = αi,∞,
where we have used the stability of (2.3) and the continuous dependence of H on the parameter α−i,n
for the first identity, the solvability of (2.3) for the second identity, and the convergence of αi,n for the
last identity. Therefore, one can put appropriate conditions on (bi, σi, f i, gi) to ensure these, and we refer
to [52, 51, 40, 41] for detailed discussions. Remark that, all assumptions are satisfied for the case of
linear-quadratic games, and thus all the above arguments can go through. We will give more details in
Section 3.
In general, problem (2.2) is not analytical tractable, and one needs to solve it numerically. Next we
present a novel architecture of DNN and a deep learning algorithm that has a parallelization feature. It
starts with a brief introduction on deep learning, followed by the detailed deep fictitious play algorithm.
2.1 Preliminaries on deep learning
Inspired by neurons in human brains, a neural network (NN) is designed for computers to learn from
observational data. It has become an effective tool in many fields including computer vision, speech
recognition, social network filtering, image analysis, etc., where results produced by NNs are comparable
or even superior to human experts. An example of NNs performing well is image classification, where the
task is to identify which of a set of categories a new observation belongs to, on the basis of a training
set of data containing observations of known category membership. Denote by x the observations and z
its category. This problem consists of efficient and accurate learning of the mapping from observations to
categories x ↪→ z(x), which can be complicated and non-trivial. Thanks to the universal approximation
theorem and the Kolmogorov-Arnold representation theorem [15, 33, 25], NNs are able to provide good
approximations to non-trivial mapping.
Our goal is to use deep neural networks to solve the stochastic control problem (2.2). NNs are made
by stacking layers one on top of another. Layers with different functions or neuron structures are called
differently, including fully-connected layer, constitutional layer, pooling layer, recurrent layers, etc.. As our
algorithm 1 will focus on fully-connected layers, we here give an example of feed-forward NN using fully-
connected layers in Figure 1. Nodes in the figure represent neurons and arrows represent the information
flow. As shown, information is constantly fed forward from one layer to the next. The first layer (leftmost
column) is called the input layer, and the last layer (rightmost column) is called the output layer. Layers
in between are called hidden layers, as they have no connection with the external world. In this case, there
is only one hidden layer with four neurons.
Figure 1: An illustration of a simple feedforward neural network.
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We now explain how information is processed in NNs. For fully-connected layers, every neuron consists
of two kinds of parameters, the weights w and the bias b. Each layer can choose an activation function,
then an input x goes through it gives f(w · x+ b). In the above example of NN, the data x = [x1, x2, x3]
fed to neuron yi outputs f(wj ·x+ bj), j = 1, . . . , 4, which yields y = [y1, y2, y3, y4] as the input of neuron
z1. The final output is z1 = f(wz · y + bz). In traditional classification problems, categorical information
z(x) associated to the input x is known, and the optimal weights and bias are chosen to minimize a loss
function L:
c(w, b) := L(z, z(x)), (2.5)
where z is the output of the NNs, as functions of (w, b), and z(x) is given from the data. The process of
finding optimal parameters is called the training of an NN.
The activation function f and loss function L are chosen at the user’s preference, and common choices
are sigmoid
1
1 + ex
, ReLU x+ for f , and mean squared error
∑ |z − z(x)|2 or cross entropy −∑ z(x) log(z)
for L in (2.5). In terms of finding the optimal parameters (w, b) in (2.5), it is in general a high-dimensional
optimization problem, and usually done by various stochastic gradient descent methods (e.g. Adam [32, 55],
NADAM [17]). For further discussions, we refer to [26, Section 2.1] and [29, Section 2.2].
However, solving (2.2) is not in line with the above procedure, in the sense that there is no target
category z(x) assigned to each input x, and consequently, the loss function is not a distance measuring
between the network output z and z(x). We aim at approximating the optimal strategy at each stage
by feedforward NNs. What we actually use NN is its ability of approximating complex relations by
composition of simple functions (by stacking fully connected layers) and finding the (sub-)optimizer with
its well-developed built-in stochastic gradient descent (SGD) solvers. We shall explain further the structures
of NNs in the following section.
2.2 Deep learning algorithms
We introduce the algorithms of deep learning based on fictitious play by describing two key parts as below.
2.2.1 Part I: solve a stochastic control problem using DNN
We in fact solve a time discretization version of problem (2.2). Partitioning [0, T ] into NT equally-spaced
intervals, with the time step h = T/NT . Denote by F˜ := {F˜k, 0 ≤ k ≤ NT } the “discretized” filtration
with F˜k = σ{Wjh, 0 ≤ j ≤ k}. An discrete-time analogy of (2.2) is:
α˜i,n+1 = arg min
{βikh∈F˜k}
NT−1
k=0
J˜ i(βi; α˜−i,n),
where
J˜ i(βi; α˜−i,n) := E
[
NT−1∑
k=0
f i
(
kh,Xkh, (β
i
kh, α˜
−i,n
kh )
)
h+ gi(XT )
]
,
and each entry X`kh in Xkh follows the Euler scheme of (1.1) associated to the strategy β
` if ` = i, and to
α˜`,n if ` 6= i:
X`(k+1)h = X
`
kh + b
`(kh,Xkh, (β
i
kh, α˜
−i,n
kh ))h+ σ
`(kh,Xkh, (β
`
kh, α˜
−i,n
kh ))(W
`
(k+1)h −W `kh)
+ σ0(kh,Xkh, (β
i
kh, α˜
−i,n
kh ))(W
0
(k+1)h −W 0kh), ` ∈ I.
(2.6)
Remark that the above time discretization uses Euler scheme, and thus leads to an weak error of O(h) and
a strong error of O(√h).
In the discrete setting, βikh ∈ F˜k is interpreted as βikh = βikh(X0,Wh, . . . ,Wkh). Our task is to
approximate the functional dependence of the control on noises. Similar to the strategy used in [20], we
implement this by a multilayer feedforward sub-network:
βikh ∼ βikh(X0,Wh, . . . ,Wkh|θikh), (2.7)
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where θikh denotes the collection of all weights and biases in the k
th sub-network for player i. Then, at
stage n+ 1, the optimization problem for player i becomes
min
{θikh}NT−1k=0
E
[
NT−1∑
k=0
f i
(
kh,Xkh, (β
i
kh(θ
i
kh), α˜
−i,n
kh
)
)h+ gi (XT )
]
. (2.8)
Denote by θi,n+1kh the minimizer of (2.8), then the approximated optimal strategy α˜
i,n+1 is given by (2.7)
evaluated at θi,n+1kh . Note that even though we only write explicitly the dependence of β
i’s on θi, it affects
all Xi’s through interactions (2.6). In fact, X`kh depends on {θi,n+10 , . . . , θi,n+1(k−1)h}, for all ` ∈ I. Therefore,
finding the gradient in minimizing (2.8) is a non-trivial task. Thanks to the key feature of NNs, computation
can be done via a forward-backward propagation algorithm derived from chain rule composition [48].
The architecture of the NN for finding α˜i,n+1 is presented in Figure 2: “InputLayer” are inputs of
this network; “Rcost” and “Tcost”, representing running and terminal cost, contribute to the total cost
J i; “Sequential” is a multilayer feedforward subnetwork for control approximation at each time step;
“Concatenate” is an auxiliary layer combining some of previous layers as inputs of “Sequential”.
Figure 2: Illustration of the network architecture for problem (2.8) with NT = T = 3.
There are three main kinds of information flows in the network for each period [kh, (k + 1)h], k =
0, . . . NT − 1:
1. Statekh := (X0,Wh, . . . ,Wkh) → βikh given by “Sequential” layer. It is an L-layer feed-forward
subnetwork to approximate the control of player i at time kh, containing parameters θikh to be
optimized.
2. (Xkh, β
i
kh,α
−i,n
kh , dW(k+1)h := W(k+1)h −Wkh) → X(k+1)h given by “Rcost” layer. This layer
possesses two functions. Firstly, it computes the running cost at time kh using (Xkh, β
i
kh, α˜
−i,n
kh ),
where βikh is produced from previous step. The cost is then added to the final output. Secondly, it
updates states value X(k+1)h via dynamics (2.6), using β
i
kh for player i and using α
−i,n
kh for player
j 6= i which are inputs of the network. No parameter is minimized at this layer.
3. (Statekh, dW(k+1)h)→ State(k+1)h given by “Concatenate” layer. This layer combines two previous
ones together, acting as a preparation for the input of “Sequential” layer. No parameter is minimized
at this layer.
At time T = NT × h, the terminal cost is calculated using XT and added to the final output via “Tcost”
layer. With these preparations, we introduce the deep fictitious play as below.
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2.2.2 Part II: find an equilibrium by fictitious play
Here we use a flowchart to describe the algorithm of deep fictitious play (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Deep Fictitious Play for Finding Nash Equilibrium
Require: N = # of players, NT = # of subintervals on [0, T ], M = # of training paths, M
′ = # of
out-of-sample paths for final evaluation, α0 = {αi,0kh ∈ A ⊂ Rk, i ∈ I}NT−1k=0 = initial belief, X0 = {xi0 ∈
Rd, i ∈ I} = initial states
1: Create N separated deep neural networks as described in Section 2.2.1
2: Generate M sample path of BM: W = {W ikh ∈ Rm, i ∈ I ∪ {0}}NTk=1
3: n← 0
4: repeat
5: for i← 1 to N do
6: n← n+ 1
7: (Continue to) Train ith NN with data {X0,α−i,n−1 = {αj,n−1kh , j ∈ I \ {i}}NT−1k=0 ,W }
8: Obtain the approximated optimal strategy αi,n and cost J i(αi,n;α−i,n−1)
9: end for
10: Collect optimal policies at stage n: αn ← (α1,n, . . . , αN,n)
11: Compute relative change of cost errn := max
i∈I
{∣∣J i(αi,n;α−i,n−1)− J i(αi,n−1;α−i,n−2)∣∣
J i(αi,n−1;α−i,n−2)
}
12: until errn go below a threshold
13: Generate M ′ out-of-sample paths of BM for final evaluation
14: n′ ← 0
15: repeat
16: n′ ← n′ + 1
17: Evaluate ith NN with {X0, α−i,n′−1, out-of-sample paths}, ∀i ∈ I
18: Obtain αi,n
′
and J i,n
′
:= J i(αi,n
′
;α−i,n
′−1) ∀i ∈ I
19: until J i,n
′
converges in n′, ∀i ∈ I
20: return The optimal policy αi,n
′
, and the final cost for each player J i,n
′
2.3 Implementation
Computing environment. The Algorithm 1 described in Section 2.2.2 is implemented in Python using
the high-level neural network API Keras [13]. Numerical examples will be presented in Section 4. All
experiments are performed using Amazon EC2 services, which provide a variety of instances for computing
acceleration. All computations uses NVIDIA K80 GPUs with 12GiB of GPU memory on Deep Learning
Amazon Machine Image running on Ubuntu 16.04.
Parallelizability. As N going relatively large, to make computation manageable, one can distribute
Step 5 − 9 to several GPUs. That is, assigning each available GPU the task of training a subset of
neural networks, where this subset is fixed from stage to stage. This will speed up the computation time
significantly, as peer-to-peer GPU communications are not needed in the designed algorithm.
Input, output and parameters for neural networks. Before training, we sample W = {W ikh ∈ Rm, i ∈
I}NTk=1, which, together with the initial states X0 and initial belief α0 = {αi,0kh ∈ A ⊂ Rk, i ∈ I}NT−1k=0 , are
the inputs of NNs. Adam, a variant of SGD that adaptively estimate lower-order moments, is chosen to
optimize the parameters {θikh}NT−1k=0 . The hyper-parameters set for Adam solver follows the original paper
[32]. Regarding the architecture of “Sequential”, it is a L-layered subnetwork. We set L = 4, with 1 input
layer, 2 hidden layers, and 1 output layer containing k nodes. Rectified linear unit is chosen for hidden
layers while no activation is applied to the output layer. We also add Batch Normalization [30] for hidden
layers before activation. This method performs the normalization for each training mini-batch to eliminate
internal covariate shift phenomenon, and thus frees us from delicate parameter initialization. It also acts
as a regularizer, in some cases eliminating the need for Dropout. Note that the choice of L and size of
{θikh}NT−1k=0 are empirical. For testing problems that have benchmark solutions, one can do grid-search
method to select the one with the best performance in the validation set. However, for real problems there
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is no universal rule for all problem settings.
Parameters of the network are initialized at Step 1. In Step 7, training continues from previous stage
without re-initialization. This is because, although opponents’ policies change from stage to stage, they
will not vary significantly and parameter values from previous stage should be better than a random
initialization. For fixed computational budget, instead of using the stopping criteria in Step 12 one can
terminate the loop until n reaches a predetermined upper bound n¯. In Step 7, the number of epochs to
train the model at every single stage does not need to be large (at the scale of hundreds). This is because
we are not aiming at a one-time accurate approximation of the optimal policy. Especially at the first few
rounds when opponents’ policies are far from optimal, pursuing accurate approximation is not meaningful.
Instead, by using small budget to obtain moderate accuracy at each iteration, we are able to repeat the
game for more times. In summary, for the two computational scheme: large n¯ small epochs, and small n¯
large epochs, the former one is better.
If opponents’ policies stay the same from stage to stage, then the two schemes receive the same accuracy.
This is justified by the following argument: Suppose opponents’ policies stay the same, then player i
essentially faces the same optimization problem from stage to stage. Since we do not re-initialize network
parameters in Step 7, the difference between the two schemes is to train the same problem with small
epochs and large rounds vs. large epochs and small rounds. This is the same in terms of SGD training,
thus should lead to the same relative error. In reality, the opponents’ policies is updated from time to time,
and the former scheme enables us to obtain player i’s reaction with more updated belief of his opponents.
Step 15-19 are not computational costly, and the value functions usually converge after several iterations
in our numerical study.
3 Linear-Quadratic games
Although the deep fictitious theory and algorithm can be applied for any N -player game, the proof of
convergence is in general hard. Here we consider a special case of linear-quadratic symmetric N -player
games, and analyze the convergence of αn defined in (2.2). The strategy analyzed here will provide an
open-loop Nash equilibrium, as proved at the end of section.
We follow the linear-quadratic model proposed in [12], where players’s dynamics interact through their
empirical mean:
dXit = [a(Xt −Xit) + αit] dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2 dW it
)
, Xi0 = x
i, Xt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xit . (3.1)
Here {W it , 0 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent standard Brownian motions (BMs). Each player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
controls the drift by αit in order to minimize the cost functional
J i(α1, . . . , αN ) = E
{∫ T
0
f i(Xt, α
i
t) dt+ g
i(XT )
}
, (3.2)
with the running cost defined by
f i(x, α) =
1
2
α2 − qα(x¯− xi) + 
2
(x¯− xi)2, x¯ = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi,
and the terminal cost function gi by
gi(x) =
c
2
(x¯− xi)2.
All parameters a, , c, q are non-negative, and q2 ≤  is imposed so that f i(x, α) is convex in (x, a). In [12],
Xit is viewed as the log-monetary reserves of bank i at time t. For further interpretation, we refer to [12].
In the spirit of fictitious play, the N -player game is recasted into N individual optimal control problems
played iteratively. The players start with a smooth belief of their opponents’ actions α0. At stage n+1, the
players have observed the same past controls αi,n’s, and then each player optimizes her control problem
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individually, assuming other players will follow their choice at state n. That is, for player i’s problem,
her dynamics are controlled through αit, while other players’ states evolve according to the past strategies
α−i,n:
dXi,n+1t = [a(X
n+1
t −Xi,n+1t ) + αit] dt+ σ(ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2 dW it ), (3.3)
dXj,n+1t = [a(X
n+1
t −Xj,n+1t ) + αj,nt ] dt+ σ(ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2 dW jt ), j 6= i. (3.4)
Player i faces an optimal control problem:
inf
αi∈A
J i,n+1(αi;α−i,n), where
J i,n+1(αi;α−i,n) := E
{∫ T
0
1
2
(αit)
2 − qαit(X
n+1
t −Xi,n+1t ) +

2
(X
n+1
t −Xi,n+1t )2 dt+
c
2
(X
n+1
T −Xi,n+1T )2
}
.
(3.5)
The space where we search for optimal αi is the space of square-integrable progressively-measurable R-
valued processes on A := H2T (R), to be consistent with open-loop equilibria. Denote by αi,n+1 the minimizer
of this control problem at stage n+ 1:
αi,n+1 := arg min
αi∈A
J i,n+1(αi;α−i,n). (3.6)
In what follows, we shall show:
(a) αi,n+1 exists ∀i ∈ I, n ∈ N, that is, the minimal cost in (3.5) is always attainable;
(b) the family {αn} converges;
(c) the limit of αn forms an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
3.1 The probabilistic approach
Observing that the cost functional J i,n+1 in (3.5) solely depends on the process X˜i,n+1 := X
n+1 −Xi,n+1
and the control αi, we make the following simplification. Notice that (3.3) and (3.4) imply
dX˜i,n+1t =
[∑
j 6=i α
j,n
t
N
− N − 1
N
αit − aX˜i,n+1t
]
dt+ σ
√
1− ρ2( 1
N
N∑
i=1
dW it − dW it ). (3.7)
Then, player i’s problem is equivalent to:
inf
αi∈A
E
{∫ T
0
1
2
(αit)
2 − qαitX˜i,n+1t +

2
(X˜i,n+1t )
2 dt+
c
2
(X˜i,n+1T )
2
}
.
In what follows, we show the existence of unique minimizer, denoted by αi,n+1, using SMP. The Hamil-
tonian for player i at stage n+ 1 reads as
Hi,n+1(t, ω, x, y, α) = (
∑
j 6=i α
j,n
t
N
− N − 1
N
α− ax)y + 1
2
α2 − qαx+ 
2
x2.
For a given admissible control αi ∈ A, the adjoint processes (Y i,n+1t , Zi,j,n+1t , 0 ≤ j ≤ N) satisfy the
backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE):
dY i,n+1t = −[−aY i,n+1t − qαit + X˜i,n+1t ] dt+
N∑
j=0
Zi,j,n+1t dW
j
t , (3.8)
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with the terminal condition Y i,n+1T = cX˜
i,n+1
T . Standard results on BSDE [50], together with the estimates
on the controlled state X˜i,n+1t , guarantee the existence and uniqueness of adjoint processes. Pontryagin
SMP suggests the form of optimizer:
∂αH
i,n+1 = 0 ⇐⇒ αˆ = qx+ N − 1
N
y. (3.9)
Plugging this candidate into the system (3.7)-(3.8) produces a system of affine FBSDEs:
dX˜i,n+1t =
[∑
j 6=i α
j,n
t
N
− (a+ (1− 1
N
)q)X˜i,n+1t − (1−
1
N
)2Y i,n+1t
]
dt+ σ
√
1− ρ2( 1
N
N∑
i=1
dW it − dW it ),
dY i,n+1t = −[−(a+ (1−
1
N
)q)Y i,n+1t + (− q2)X˜i,n+1t ] dt+
N∑
j=0
Zi,j,n+1t dW
j
t ,
X˜i,n+10 = x0 − xi0, Y i,n+1T = cX˜i,n+1T .
(3.10)
The sufficient condition of SMP suggests that if we solves (3.10), we actually have obtained the optimal
control by plugging its solution into equation (3.9). In fact, the coefficients satisfy the G-monotone property
in [52], thus the system is uniquely solved in H2T (R×R×RN+1), and the resulted optimal control is indeed
admissible. This answers question (a). For the other two questions, we need to further analyze (3.10).
Note that the system can be decoupled using:
Y i,n+1t = KtX˜
i,n+1
t − ψi,n+1t , (3.11)
where Kt satisfies the Riccati equation:
K˙t = 2(a+ (1− 1
N
)q)Kt + (
N − 1
N
)2K2t − (− q2), KT = c, (3.12)
and the decoupled processes (X˜i,n+1t , ψ
i,n+1
t , φ
i,j,n+1
t , 0 ≤ j ≤ N) satisfy:
dX˜i,n+1t =
[∑
j 6=i α
j,n
t
N
− γtX˜i,n+1t + (1−
1
N
)2ψi,n+1t
]
dt+ σ
√
1− ρ2( 1
N
N∑
i=1
dW it − dW it ),
dψi,n+1t = −[−γtψi,n+1t −Kt
∑
j 6=i α
j,n
t
N
] dt+
N∑
j=0
φi,j,n+1t dW
j
t ,
X˜i,n+10 = x0 − xi0, ψi,n+1T = 0,
(3.13)
where γt is a deterministic function on [0, T ]:
γt = a+ (1− 1
N
)q + (1− 1
N
)2Kt, (3.14)
and the optimal strategy is expressed as
αi,n+1t = (q + (1−
1
N
)Kt)X˜
i,n+1
t − (1−
1
N
)ψi,n+1t . (3.15)
Again, since αn ∈ H2T (RN ), existence and uniqueness of (ψi,n+1, φi,j,n+1, 0 ≤ j ≤ N) ∈ H2(R × RN+1) is
guaranteed ∀i ∈ I, n ∈ N, and the forward equation possesses a unique strong solution. Then the triple
(Xi,n+1, Y i,n+1, Zi,j,n+1) solves the original FBSDEs (3.10) with Y i,n+1t defined by (3.11) and Z
i,j,n+1
t by
Zi,0,n+1t = −φi,0,n+1t , Zi,j,n+1t = −φi,j,n+1t +Ktσ
√
1− ρ2( 1
N
− δi,j), j ∈ I.
To answer questions (b) and (c), we state the main theorem in this section, with the proofs presented
in the next subsections.
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Theorem 3.1. For linear-quadratic games, the family {αn}n∈N defined in (3.5)-(3.6) converges if
1− e−2Tγ
γ
C < 1. (3.16)
It forms an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the original problem (3.1)-(3.2). Moreover, the limit, denote by
α∞, is independent from the choice of initial belief α0. Here γ = a + (1 − 1N )q + (1 − 1N )2K, K and K
are the maximum and minimum value of Kt on [0, T ], and the constant C is
C = (1− 1
N
)2
(
(1− 1
N
)2K
2
+ (q + (1− 1
N
)K)2
(
1− e−2Tγ
γ
(1− 1
N
)4K
2
+ 2
))
. (3.17)
Remark 3.2. The condition (3.16) is sufficient but not necessary. The numerical performance of the
proposed algorithm can do better. In Section 4, the parameters are chosen so that the condition is violated,
but the algorithm still converges fast, in order to illustrate the sufficiency. By observing the form of C and
γ, we remark that the convergence rate decreases in the number of players N .
Proposition 3.3. The following three classes of parameters satisfy condition (3.16):
(i) Small time duration, that is, T is small.
(ii) Strong mean-reversion rate, i.e., a is large.
(iii) Small terminal cost and small intensive to borrowing or landing, that is, c and q are small. Also the
“remaining” running cost of the state process2 is small, i.e., − q2 is small.
Proof. We first notice that the solution to (3.12) is smooth and monotone on [0, T ], by computing its
derivative:
K˙t ∼ −(− q2) + c2(1− 1
N
)2 + 2c(a+ (1− 1
N
)q).
So K = max{c,K0} and K = min{c,K0}. Also, when K˙t > 0, K0 is bounded below by −(−q
2)−cδ+
δ−−c(1− 1N )2
;
otherwise when Kt is decreasing, K0 is bounded above by by
−(−q2)−cδ+
δ−−c(1− 1N )2
, where
δ± = −(a+ (1− 1
N
)q)±
√
R, R = (a+ (1− 1
N
)q)2 + (1− 1
N
)2(− q2).
Then case (i) follows by the fact that C has a upper bound that is free of T .
For a sufficiently large, Kt is increasing and K = c. Then C has a upper bound (uniformly in a), and
case (ii) follows 1−e
−2Tγ
γ <
1
a . Under case (iii), K is sufficiently small, thus C is small and the factor is less
than 1.
3.2 Proof of convergence
This section proves Theorem 3.1. Define ∆ζi,nt := ζ
i,n+1
t − ζi,nt the difference from stage n to n+ 1 for the
ith player, with ζ = α,ψ, φ, X˜, respectively. Using equation (3.13), the increment in ψ satisfies:
d∆ψi,nt = −[−γt∆ψi,nt −
Kt
N
∑
j 6=i
∆αj,n−1t ] dt+
N∑
j=0
∆φi,j,nt dW
j
t , ∆ψ
i,n
T = 0,
whose solution is:
∆ψi,nt = E
∫ T
t
−Ks
N
∑
j 6=i
∆αj,n−1s e
∫ t
s
γu du ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 .
2The running cost f i(x, α) can be rewritten as f i(x, α) = 1
2
(α − q(x¯ − xi))2 + 1
2
( − q2)(x¯ − xi)2, therefore, can be
interpreted as penalizing the control from deviating q(x¯ − xi), borrowing or lending proportionally to the difference from
average with a rate q, as well as penalizing the distance from average with weight − q2.
12
By Jensen’s inequality, one deduces:
∥∥∆ψi,n∥∥2
2
≤
∫ T
0
E
∫ T
t
K2s
N2
∑
j 6=i
∆αj,n−1s
2 e2 ∫ ts γu du ds
 dt ≤ K2
N2
∫ T
0
∫ T
t
E
∑
j 6=i
∆αj,n−1s
2 e2(t−s)γ dsdt
=
K
2
N2
∫ T
0
E
∑
j 6=i
∆αj,n−1s
2 1− e−2sγ
2γ
ds ≤ K
2
N2
1− e−2Tγ
2γ
(N − 1)2 max
j 6=i
∫ T
0
E[∆αj,n−1s ]2 ds
≤ 1− e
−2Tγ
2γ
(1− 1
N
)2K
2
max
i∈I
∥∥∆αi,n−1∥∥2
2
,
where γ = a + (1 − 1N )q + (1 − 1N )2K. Since the RHS of the above inequality is independent of i, taking
maximum over I yields
max
i∈I
∥∥∆ψi,n∥∥2
2
≤ 1− e
−2Tγ
2γ
(1− 1
N
)2K
2
max
i∈I
∥∥∆αi,n−1∥∥2
2
. (3.18)
Similarly, the dynamics of ∆X˜i,nt can be derived from (3.13):
d∆X˜i,nt = [
1
N
∑
j 6=i
∆αj,n−1t − γt∆X˜i,nt + (1−
1
N
)2∆ψi,nt ] dt, ∆X˜
i,n
0 = 0,
which admits the solution:
∆X˜i,nt =
∫ t
0
 1
N
∑
j 6=i
∆αj,n−1s + (1−
1
N
)2∆ψi,ns
 e− ∫ ts γu du ds.
We next give an upper bound of increment of the forward process ∆X˜i,n· :
∥∥∥∆X˜i,n∥∥∥2
2
≤
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
E
 1
N
∑
j 6=i
∆αj,n−1s + (1−
1
N
)2∆ψi,ns
2 e−2 ∫ ts γu du dsdt
≤ 2
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
E[ 1
N
∑
j 6=i
∆αj,n−1s ]
2 + (1− 1
N
)4E[∆ψi,ns ]2
 e−2(t−s)γ dsdt
≤ 2
∫ T
0
E[ 1
N
∑
j 6=i
∆αj,n−1s ]
2 + (1− 1
N
)4E[∆ψi,ns ]2
 1− e−2(T−s)γ
2γ
ds
≤ 1− e
−2Tγ
γ
(
(1− 1
N
)2 max
j 6=i
∥∥∆αj,n−1∥∥2
2
+ (1− 1
N
)4
∥∥∆ψi,n∥∥2
2
)
.
Again by taking maximum over I on both sides, one has:
max
i∈I
∥∥∥∆X˜i,n∥∥∥2
2
≤ 1− e
−2Tγ
γ
(
(1− 1
N
)2 max
i∈I
∥∥∆αi,n−1∥∥2
2
+ (1− 1
N
)4 max
i∈I
∥∥∆ψi,n∥∥2
2
)
. (3.19)
Recall from (3.15) that the increment in the strategy can be decomposed as
∆αi,nt = (q + (1−
1
N
)Kt)∆X˜
i,n
t − (1−
1
N
)∆ψi,nt ,
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together with estimates (3.18) and (3.19), we obtain:
max
i∈I
∥∥∆αi,n∥∥2
2
≤ 2(q + (1− 1
N
)K)2 max
i∈I
∥∥∥∆X˜i,n∥∥∥2
2
+ 2(1− 1
N
)2 max
i∈I
∥∥∆ψi,n∥∥2
2
≤ 1− e
−2Tγ
γ
C max
i∈I
∥∥∆αi,n−1∥∥2
2
,
where C is a constant given in (3.17). Under condition (3.16), the mapping ∆αn−1 ↪→ ∆αn is a contraction.
Therefore, this proposed learning process converges in the linear-quadratic games.
Denote the limit of {αn} by α∞ = [α1,∞, . . . , αN,∞] where the learning process start with an initial
belief α0. Let (X˜i,αt , ψ
i,α
t , φ
i,α
t ) be the solution to the decoupled system (3.13) with {αj,n, j ∈ I \ {i}}
replaced by {αj,∞, j ∈ I \{i}}. On one hand, this corresponds to the problem of identifying player i’s best
strategy, while others using α−i,∞, and her best choice is
(q + (1− 1
N
)Kt)X˜
i,α
t − (1−
1
N
)ψi,αt .
On the other hand, by stability theorems (e.g. [58, Theorem 3.4.2, Theorem 4.4.3]), this triple (X˜i,αt , ψ
i,α
t , φ
i,α
t )
is also the L2 limit of (X˜i,nt , ψ
i,n
t , φ
i,n
t ). Therefore, letting n→∞ in equation (3.15) gives
αi,∞ = (q + (1− 1
N
)Kt)X˜
i,α
t − (1−
1
N
)ψi,αt . (3.20)
Therefore, the best response for player i is αi,∞, given others play α−i,∞, indicating that the limit α∞
forms an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
It remains to prove that the limit is independent from the initial belief. Suppose that there exist two
limits α∞ and β∞ arisen from two distinguished initial belief α0 and β0, and let (X˜i,βt , ψ
i,β
t , φ
i,β
t ) be the
solution to (3.13) associated with β∞. Following similar derivations in the proof of convergence gives:
max
i∈I
∥∥ψi,α − ψi,β∥∥2
2
≤ 1− e
−2Tγ
2γ
(1− 1
N
)2K
2
max
i∈I
∥∥αi,∞ − βi,∞∥∥2
2
,
max
i∈I
∥∥∥X˜i,α − X˜i,β∥∥∥2
2
≤ 1− e
−2Tγ
γ
(
(1− 1
N
)2 max
i∈I
∥∥αi,∞ − βi,∞∥∥2
2
+ (1− 1
N
)4 max
i∈I
∥∥ψi,α − ψi,β∥∥2
2
)
.
Combining the above equations together, and using (3.20) for both αi,∞ and βi,∞, we deduce:
max
i∈I
∥∥αi,∞ − βi,∞∥∥2
2
≤ 1− e
−2Tγ
γ
C max
i∈I
∥∥αi,∞ − βi,∞∥∥2
2
.
Under the same condition (3.16), α∞ = β∞ in the L2 sense. Therefore, we have shown that, independent
of initial belief, the fictitious play will converge and the limit is unique.
3.3 Identifying the limit
As proved in Theorem 3.1, the limiting strategy α∞ forms an open-loop Nash equilibrium, and in this
section, we verify it coincides with the equilibrium provided in [12] by direct calculations.
Recall from [12], the open-loop Nash equilibrium to the original N -player problem (3.1)–(3.2) is:
αi,∗t = [q + (1−
1
N
)ηt](X
∗
t −Xi,∗t ), (3.21)
where Xi,∗t is the solution to (3.1) associated with α
i,∗
t , X
∗
t is the average of X
i,∗
t , and ηt solves a Riccati
equation:
η˙t = 2(a+ (1− 1
2N
)q)ηt + (1− 1
N
)η2t − (− q2), ηT = c. (3.22)
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Note that, the expression (3.21) means the open-loop equilibrium happens to be expressed as a function
of the states in the equilibrium, but not a closed-loop feedback equilibrium. To be more precise, plugging
(3.21) into (3.1) yields
d(X
∗
t −Xi,∗t ) = −[a+ q + (1−
1
N
)ηt](X
∗
t −Xi,∗t ) dt+ σ
√
1− ρ2
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
dW it − dW it
)
.
Thus, αi,∗t is indeed Ft-measurable. To avoid further confusion in the sequel, we denote by Ξit the solution
to the above SDE, then
αi,∗t = [q + (1−
1
N
)ηt]Ξ
i
t, (3.23)
and Ξit is the unique strong solution to the SDE:
dΞit = −κtΞit dt+ σ
√
1− ρ2
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
dW it − dW it
)
, Ξi0 = x0 − xi0, (3.24)
with
κt = a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηt. (3.25)
Two properties regarding Ξit will be used in sequel: firstly,
∑N
i=1 Ξ
i
t = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. This is straight-
forward by deriving the SDE for Ξt via summing (3.24) over i ∈ I, and using Ξ0 = 0. Consequently, we
also have
∑N
i=1 α
i,∗
t = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Secondly, one has that e
∫ t
0
κu duΞit is a martingale, follows by the SDE
(3.24) and the boundedness of ηt on [0, T ].
We next verify that the limit αi,∞ coincides with (3.23) by showing the optimal control to the problem
(3.5) is αi,∗ where other players’ are following αj,∗, j 6= i, and by the uniqueness of limit under condition
(3.16). Denote by (X˜i,∗t , ψ
i,∗
t , φ
i,∗
t ) be the solution to the FBSDEs (3.13) with α
j,n replaced by αj,∗,
j ∈ I \ {i}. Essentially, the problem is to show the player i’s optimal response, represented by the solution
of FBSDEs, (q+(1− 1N )Kt)X˜i,∗t −(1− 1N )ψi,∗t matches her Nash strategy αi,∗. Note that this is not a fixed-
point argument as usually seen in mean-field games, since only α−i,∗ is needed to solve (X˜i,∗t , ψ
i,∗
t , φ
i,∗
t ).
We first solve ψi,∗ from the backward process in (3.13). The BSDE is of affine form, and thus possesses
a unique solution:
ψi,∗t = E
∫ T
t
−Ks
N
∑
j 6=i
αj,∗s e
∫ t
s
γu du ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 = E[∫ T
t
Ks
N
αi,∗s e
∫ t
s
γu du ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= E
[∫ T
t
Ks
N
[q + (1− 1
N
)ηs]Ξ
i
se
∫ t
s
γu du ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
∫ T
t
Ks
N
[q + (1− 1
N
)ηs]Ξ
i
te
− ∫ s
t
κu+γu du ds
:= F (t)Ξit.
The function F (t) satisfies
F˙ (t) = F (t)(κt + γt)− Kt
N
(q + (1− 1
N
)ηt), F (T ) = 0, (3.26)
where γt and κt are given by (3.14) and (3.25) respectively, and ηt solves (3.22). Note that (3.26) is a first
order linear ordinary differential equation (ODE) with smooth coefficients, whose solution in uniqueness
is ensured by standard ODE theory. A straightforward calculation shows Kt − ηt solves (3.26), thus
ψi,∗t = (Kt − ηt)Ξit.
Now to solve the forward equation for X˜i,∗t , we first calculate∑
j 6=i α
j,∗
N
+ (1− 1
N
)2ψi,∗t = −
αi,∗
N
+ (1− 1
N
)2(Kt − ηt)Ξit
= (− q
N
+ (1− 1
N
)2Kt − (1− 1
N
)ηt)Ξ
i
t,
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therefore
dX˜i,∗t = [(−
q
N
+ (1− 1
N
)2Kt − (1− 1
N
)ηt)Ξ
i
t − γtX˜i,∗t ] dt+ σ
√
1− ρ2
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
dW it − dW it
)
.
Comparing it to (3.24), one deduces X˜i,∗t = Ξ
i
t. Therefore, player i’s optimal response to her opponents’
strategy α−i,∗ is
(q + (1− 1
N
)Kt)X˜
i,∗
t − (1−
1
N
)ψi,∗t = (q + (1−
1
N
)Kt)Ξ
i
t − (1−
1
N
)(Kt − ηt)Ξit
= (q + (1− 1
N
)ηt)Ξ
i
t ≡ αi,∗t .
This implies that, in the linear quadratic case, the limit of fictitious play gives an open-loop Nash equilib-
rium.
4 Numerical experiments
In this section, we present the proof of methodology for deep fictitious play by applying our algorithm to
the linear-quadratic game (3.1)-(3.2), which was first introduced in [12] to study the systemic risk. We
choose this model as our study for two reasons: firstly, convergence of fictitious play under this setting has
been proved in Section 3 under model assumptions. Secondly, closed-form solution exists for this model,
which enables us to benchmark the performance of our proposed scheme. Numerical results are shown in
three examples of N = 5, 10, 24 players.
The Euler scheme (with time step h = T/NT ) of the dynamics (3.3)-(3.4) follows from (2.6) with:
b`(t,x,α) = a(x− x`) + α`, σ`(t,x,α) = σ0(t,x,α) ≡ σ, ` ∈ I.
The model parameters chosen by numerical experiments are
T = 1, σ = 1, a = 1, q = 0, ρ = 0,  = 1, c = 1.
Remarkt that in the above choice, if one computes the factor in (3.16), which gives 1−e
−2Tγ
γ C = 0.9568, 1.5420, 1.9995
for N = 5, 10, 24 respectively, then all the three cases in Proposition 3.3 failed. However, we can still ob-
tain convergent numerical results, which shows the robustness of the proposed algorithms and potential
improvement of our theoretical analysis. We choose M = 216 samples for training of the DNNs, and
M ′ = 106 out-of-samples for final evaluation. A validation split ratio of 25% and callbacks are set to avoid
over-fitting. The subnetwork for policy approximation at each time step contains 2 hidden layers and 8 + 8
neurons. During each stage, each network is trained for 200 epochs with a mini-batch of size 1024 . A
total of 10 stages are played. The true (benchmark) optimal control is computed according (3.21)-(3.22),
with ηt given in the closed form.
Example 1 (N = 5). We set the initial states of the five players as x0 = (1, 5, 7, 3, 8)
T and discretize
the time interval [0, 1] into NT = 50 steps. In Figure 3, we compare the cost functions computed by deep
fictitious play to the closed-form solution. One can see that, the relative errors of cost function for all
players drop quickly under 5% after a few iterations, and then steadily under 2% after only ten iterations.
In Figure 4, we show in the top-left panel optimal trajectories from total five players computed by deep
fictitious play (black star lines) vs. by closed-form formulae (colored solid lines) at one representative
realization. One can observe that players, although start away from each other, become closer as time
evolves. This is consistent with the mechanism of costs functions, as they are in favor of being together.
To quantitatively measure the performance of our algorithm, we show the mean and standard deviation
of the difference between NN predictions and the true solutions in the rest panels based on a total of 106
sample paths. The means are almost zero, with slightly convex or concave curves depending on player’s
relative ranking initially. Players start below average tend to have convex feature.
Standard numerical schemes can do well to approximate cost functions, but not on the derivatives,
which are related to the controls, while our deep learning algorithm computes directly the control, which
shows a good approximation. Figure 5 plots two visualized paths of controls for an illustration purpose.
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Figure 3: Comparisons of cost functions for N = 5 players in the linear quadratic game. The dotted dash lines
are the analytical cost functions given by the closed-form solution for each individual player. The solid lines are
the cost functions given by deep fictitious play for each player at the first 10 iterations. The bottom-right panel
shows the relative errors of cost function for the five players, which are pretty small at the 10th iteration.
Figure 4: Comparisons of optimal trajectories for N = 5 players in the linear quadratic game. Top-left panel: a
single sample path of the true optimal trajectories Xt (solid lines) vs. the ones computed by deep fictitious play
X̂t (star lines). The other panels show the mean (blue triangles) and standard deviation (red bars, plotted every
other time step) of optimal trajectories errors for five players using a total sample of 106 paths. Overall, they show
a good approximation of deep fictitious play to the linear quadratic game by N = 5 players.
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Figure 5: Comparisons of optimal controls for N = 5 players in the linear quadratic game. For a sake of clarity,
we only show two sample paths of optimal controls for each player. The solid lines are optimal controls given by
the closed-form solution, and the dotted dash lines are computed by deep fictitious play.
Example 2 (N = 10). The initial state for ith player is xi0 = 0.5 + 0.05(i − 1). We use N = 20 time
steps for the discretization of the time interval [0, 1]. Such choices enable us to investigate the sensitivity
of deep learning algorithm on initial positions and time step. In Figure 6, we compare the cost functions
computed by deep fictitious play to the closed-form solution, where, after only ten iterations, the maximum
relative error of cost function for all players have been reduced to less than 3%, and the computed optimal
trajectories (one visualized sample path) of selected four players by fictitious play coincide with those of
the closed-form solution. The standard deviation of difference between approximated and true optimal
trajectories as less then 2% for t ∈ [0, 1] for all players, and we present a selection of six in Figure 7.
Note that, although the time step h is twice larger than N = 5, the relative error does not increase
significantly. However, we do not observe that the trajectories are getting closer and closer as in the case
of N = 5, since they already start in the neighborhood of each other. We do not observe the curve neither,
which justify our assertion that the curvature depends on x0 − xi0. We also show two visualized sample
paths of optimal control in Figure 8, which presents a good approximation of the policy.
Figure 6: Comparisons of cost functions and optimal trajectories for N = 10 players in the linear quadratic game.
Left: the maximum relative errors of the cost functions for ten players; Right: for a sake of clarity, we only present
the comparison of optimal trajectories for the 1st, 4th, 7th and 10th players, where the solid lines are given by the
closed-form solution and the stars are computed by deep fictitious play.
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Figure 7: Comparisons of optimal trajectories for N = 10 players in the linear quadratic game. For a sake of
clarity, we only show the mean (blue triangles) and standard deviation (red bars) of optimal trajectories errors for
the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 7th, 8th and 10th player, respectively. The results are based on a total sample of 65536 paths, and
show that deep fictitious play provides a uniformly good accuracy of optimal trajectories.
Figure 8: Comparisons of optimal controls for N = 10 players in the linear quadratic game. For a sake of clarity,
we only show two sample paths of optimal controls for the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 7th, 8th and 10th player, respectively. The
solid lines are optimal controls given by the closed-form solution, and the dotted dash lines are computed by deep
fictitious play.
Example 3 (N = 24). The initial positions for the ith player is xi0 = 0.5i. We set the time steps
NT = 20, after observing the relative errors did not increase too much from NT = 50 to NT = 20. The
problem by natural is high-dimensional: the kth “Sequential” subnetwork maps RNk to R. To accelerate
the computation, we distribute the training to 8 GPUs. Similar studies to the N = 10 case are presented
in Figures 9-11. Some key features that have been observed from previous numerical experiments: the
maximum of relative error drops below 3% after ten iterations; the average error of estimated trajectories
are convex/concave functions of time t; the standard deviation of estimated error aggregates from steps to
steps. In fact, the convexity/concavity with respect to time t is caused by two factors: the propagation
of errors, which produces an magnitude increase in error mean; and the existence of terminal cost, which
puts more weights on XT than Xt, t ∈ (0, T ), resulting in a better estimate of XT and a decreasing effect.
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Figure 9: Comparisons of cost functions and optimal trajectories for N = 24 players in the linear quadratic game.
Left: the maximum relative errors of the cost functions for ten players; Right: for a sake of clarity, we only present
the comparison of optimal trajectories for the 1st, 4th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 16th, 19th and 22th players, where the solid
lines are given by the closed-form solution and the stars are computed by deep fictitious play.
Figure 10: Comparisons of optimal trajectories for N = 24 players in the linear quadratic game. For a sake of
clarity, we only show the mean (blue triangles) and standard deviation (red bars) of optimal trajectories errors for
the 1st, 4th, 7th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 16th, 19th and 22th player, respectively. The results are based on a total sample
of 65536 paths, show that deep fictitious play provides a uniformly good accuracy of optimal trajectories.
To better illustrate that our algorithm can overcome the curse of dimensionality, we compare the
performance across different N . Particularly, we compute
max
i∈I
max
k≤NT
∣∣∣Xikh − X̂ikh∣∣∣
where X denotes the state process following the open-loop Nash equilibrium, while X̂ is the deep fictitious
20
Figure 11: Comparisons of optimal controls for N = 24 players in the linear quadratic game. For a sake of clarity,
we only show two sample paths of optimal controls for the 1st, 4th, 7th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 16th, 19th and 22th player,
respectively. The solid lines are optimal controls given by the closed-form solution, and the dotted dash lines are
computed by deep fictitious play.
play counterpart. The L1 error is 1.09 × 10−2 for N = 5, 1.49 × 10−2 for N = 10 and 2.08 × 10−2 for
N = 24.
5 Conclusion, discussion and extension
In this paper, the deep fictitious play theory is proposed to compute the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric
N -player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games. We apply the strategy of fictitious play by letting
individual player optimize her own payoff while fixing the control of the other players at each stage, and
then repeat the game until their responses do not change to much from stage to stage. Finding the best
response for each player at each stage is a stochastic optimal control problem, which we approximate by
deep neural networks (DNNs). By the nature of open-loop strategies, the problem is recasted into repeated
training of N decoupled neural networks (NNs), where inputs of each NN depend on the other NNs’
outputs from previous training. Using Keras and parallel GPU simulation, the deep learning algorithm
can be applied to any N -player stochastic differential game with different symmetries and heterogeneities.
The numerical accuracy and efficiency is illustrated by comparing to the closed-form solution of the linear
quadratic case. We also prove the convergence of fictitious play under appropriate assumptions, and show
that the convergent limit forms an open-loop Nash equilibrium. In the following, we shall discuss the
extensions to other strategies of fictitious play and closed-loop Nash equilibrium.
5.1 Belief based on time average of past play
In the formulation (2.2), players’ belief is based on their actions during last round, i.e. at stage n + 1,
players myopically respond to their opponents’ policies at stage n without considering all decisions before
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n. This is in fact a bit discrepant from Brown’s definition [6, 7], where players responses take into account
all past policies. Denote by α˜−i,n is the weighted average of past play,
α˜−i,n =
1
n
n∑
k=1
α−i,k, (5.1)
then Brown’s original idea corresponds to the control problem:
αi,n+1 := arg min
βi∈A
J i(βi; α˜−i,n), ∀i ∈ I, n ∈ N.
where J i is defined as in (2.1).
In general, convergence in the strategy αn implies convergence in the average of past play α˜n, but not
vice versa. Therefore, convergence in α˜n does not necessarily lead to a Nash equilibrium. Our numerical
tests show that, if the algorithm converges in αn, then using α˜n tends to give a better rate for linear
quadratic cases. In practice, within the framework of deep fictitious play, one can generalize (5.1) to any
weighted average of past policies:
∑n
k=0 ckα
−i,k, where (ck)nk=0 is a n-simplex with cn > 0. We plan to
further investigate the comparison between different beliefs for practical problems in future.
5.2 Belief updated alternatively
We shall also mention that, there are actually two versions of fictitious play, the alternating fictitious play
(AFP), originally invented in [6], and the simultaneous fictitious play (SFP) mentioned as a minor variant
of AFP in [6]. In contract to (2.2), the players under AFP update their beliefs alternatively. For example,
in the case N = 2, the learning process is:
α1,n+1 := arg min
β1∈A
J1(β1;α2,n), α2,n := arg min
β2∈A
J2(β2;α1,n), n ≥ 1,
and the computation follows α2,0(initial belief) → α1,1 → α2,1 → α1,2 → α2,2 → . . .. The dependence of
α2,n on α1,n makes one not able to update them simultaneously, which is the main difference from SFP.
Indeed, SFP can be considered as a simpler learning process than AFP, as players are treated symmet-
rically in time. This usually enhances analytical convenience as well as numerical efficiency (with possible
parallel implementation in Step 5-9 of Algorithm 1). Gradually, the original AFP seems to disappear from
the literature, and people focus on SFP, even though SFP may generate subtle problems which do not arise
under AFP. For a comparison study, we refer to [4], where they also related this subtly to Monderer and
Sela’s Improvement Principle [45]. We focused on SFP in this paper, where the beliefs can be updated in
parallel, and leave the AFP learning process for future studies.
5.3 The algorithm for closed-loop Nash equilibrium
Depending on the space we search for βi in (2.2), the algorithm can lead to a Nash equilibrium in different
setting. Indeed, if consider [0, T ]× (Rd)N 3 (t,x)→ βi ∈ A ⊂ Rk as a function of current states, then the
limit yields a feedback strategy for Nash equilibrium. Mathematically,
αi,n+1(t,x) := arg min
βi(t,x)∈A
J i(βi(Xi,β
i
t ,X
−i,α−i,n
t );α
−i,n(Xi,β
i
t ,X
−i,α−i,n
t )), (5.2)
where X−i,α
−i,n
t represents players j 6= i state processes following policies α−i,n.
This setup can be analyzed by the the partial differential equation (PDE) approach. Assuming enough
regularity, the minimal cost can be reformulated as the classical solution to HJB equation where others’
strategies are given by deterministic functions obtained from previous round. Consequently, at each stage,
the task is to solve N independent HJB equations, which can still be implemented in parallel. Moreover, if
the players are statistically identical, one actually only needs to solve one PDE. Denote by V i,n+1(t,x) the
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value function of problem (5.2) at time t with initial states Xt = x, by dynamic programming, it satisfies
∂tV
i,n+1 + inf
β
{
bi(t,x, β)∂xiV
i,n+1 + f i(t,x, β) +
1
2
Tr
[
∂2xi,xiV
i,n+1σi(t,x, β)σi(t,x, β)†
]
+
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
Tr
[
∂2xi,xjV
i,n+1σi(t,x, β)Σi,jσj(t,x, αj,n)†
]}
+
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
bj(t,x, αj,n)∂xjV
i,n+1 +
1
2
N∑
j,k=1
j 6=i
k 6=i
Tr
[
∂2xj ,xkV
i,n+1σj(t,x, αj,n)Σj,kσk(t,x, αk,n)†
]
= 0,
αi,n ≡ αi,n(t,x) := arg min
β∈A
{
bi(t,x, β)∂xiV
i,n + f i(t,x, β)
}
, Σj,k dt := d
〈
W j ,W k
〉
t
.
Then, numerically, one can design traditional finite different/element methods, or use deep learning which
has been shown excellent performance in overcoming the curse of dimensionality in high-dimensional PDEs
[18, 21]. After all, the optimal response function αi,n+1 is given in terms of ∂xiV
i,n+1, ∂2xi,xjV
i,n+1. How-
ever, a common drawback of working on the value function J i is that numerical schemes usually well
approximate the solution but not the derivative of the solution, which is more sensitive.
An alternative way is to work directly on the control. By a stochastic maximum principle argument,
the optimal control is linked to the solution (not the derivative) of FBSDEs, see, e.g., [10, Section 2.2].
Then it is promising to apply the recent deep learning algorithm for the coupled FBSDEs [22]. In this case,
at each stage, the task is to solve N independent FBSDEs and parallel implementation is still possible.
Both approaches rely on the property of the reformulated problem: the solution’s regularity in the PDE
approach and the Hamiltonian’s convexity in the FBSDEs approach. A third possibility is to work with the
optimization (5.2) directly as we do in the open-loop case. That is, using the deep NN to approximate the
control and find the optimal parameters that minimize (5.2). However, due to the feedback reaction, the
Algorithm 1 and architectures proposed in Section 2.2 are no longer suitable. It is this “indirect” reaction
nature of the open-loop strategy that enables us to design N separate NNs and a scalable algorithm. While
working with feedback controls, the realized opponents’ strategies α−i,n(t,Xt) depend on βi. Further
explained by Figure 2, this means that, α−i1 , previously considered as intermediate outputs from NNs of
other players at previous training, now depends on βi0 through X
i
1. Consequently, to take into account the
direct reaction of her opponents, one needs to feed βi0 to player j
th NN, j 6= i for intermediate output α−i1 .
This makes the N -neural networks coupled with each other, and hard to implement in parallel.
Apparently, using deep fictitious play for Markovian Nash equilibrium is not a simple modification of
Algorithm 1, which we shall further study the three above-mentioned approaches and investigate their
optimality in our future works.
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